

Security Evaluation of Vehicular Electronic Control Units

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About Me

- I have been focusing on hardware and embedded systems security for 10+ years
 - Topics of cryptography, side-channel analysis, fault injection attacks, and countermeasures
- Co-authored over 70 research papers and 2 books on cybersecurity
 - Most of them accessible at <u>https://jbreier.com/</u>
- I am a Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) and Certified Automotive Cybersecurity Professional (CACSP)
- Currently, I work at TTControl GmbH, Vienna, Austria
 - \rightarrow Manufacturer of safety ECUs and HMIs for off-highway market
 - \rightarrow I focus on product security ensuring the products support the state-of-the-art security



Agenda

Introduction to car security
EU standards and legislation
Security evaluation of ECUs



Source: Microsoft Copilot



Introduction to Car Security



Electronic Control Unit (ECU)

- Embedded system in automotive electronics that controls one or more of the electrical systems or subsystems in a vehicle
- Modern cars can have up to 150 ECUs [1]
 - \rightarrow Connected via Controller Area Network (CAN) bus
- Entire code base reaches over 100 million lines of code [2]
 - \rightarrow Linux kernel has around 1/3 of that [3]
 - \rightarrow Increasing complexity is a key challenge for manufacturers
- Functional safety is the main concern
 - \rightarrow There is no safety without security
 - \rightarrow Especially in connected/autonomous vehicles



^{1]} https://www.eenewseurope.com/en/number-of-automotive-ecus-continues-to-rise/

^[2] https://www.kpit.com/insights/a-car-has-over-hundred-million-lines-of-code-know-how-code-gets-assembled/

^[3] https://github.com/torvalds/linux



Need for Car Security

- Any digital system can be compromised
 - \rightarrow It is the question of resources equipment, expertise, time
- Originally, ECUs were on a closed CAN bus, without out-of-vehicle connectivity
 - \rightarrow As long as physical connectors were protected, the network was secure





2015 Jeep Hack

- Fully remote, via WiFi or cellular
- The first step was to connect to the infotainment head unit (Fiat Chrysler Automotive UConnect)
 - → At this point, the attacker can control the A/C, media output, etc.
 - The attacker is not yet capable of changing the car functions
- The second step was to remotely install a malicious firmware through the hacked infotainment system
 - \rightarrow The attacker can now control all the vehicle functions
 - → Steering, braking, engine, changing the speedometer readings, etc.



Source: Andy Greenberg/WIRED



EU Standards and Legislation



Overview of EU Legislation

- Main regulations for passenger cars, vans, trucks, buses
 - \rightarrow Cyber security UN ECE 155 regulation applicable to all road vehicles (July 2024)
 - → SW update Over The Air UN ECE 156 regulation applicable to all road vehicles (July 2024)
- Main standard
 - → ISO/SAE 21434 engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management for road vehicle
- Mobile machinery
 - → EU 2023/1230 regulation update applicable for machineries, incl. cybersecurity (January 2027)
- Products with digital elements
 - \rightarrow Cyber Resilience Act applicable for all kind of electronic equipment (Q4 2027)
- Products with wireless communication
 - → EU RED 2014/53 new delegated regulation applicable for all radio equipment (August 2025)



UNECE WP.29 R155 and R156

- In force since July 2024
- The UN regulation 155 (R155) is on uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to cybersecurity and a cybersecurity management system (CSMS)
 - \rightarrow The regulation works at the *vehicle* level
- CSMS requirements need to be satisfied to be allowed to apply for type approval
- R156 is a related regulation, focusing on software updates, also concerning cybersecurity
- It refers to ISO/SAE 21434 standard
- R155 requires measures to be implemented by the vehicle manufacturer and to passenger cars, vans, trucks and buses; light four-wheeler vehicles if equipped with automated driving functionalities from level 3 onwards; trailers if fitted with at least one electronic control unit



Discontinued Car Models due to R155

Car Maker	Model	Discontinued by
Porsche	Boxster	July 2024
Porsche	718 Cayman	July 2024
VW	Up!	June 2024
VW	Transporter 6.1	June 2024
Audi	R8	June 2024
Audi	ТТ	June 2024
Porsche	Macan	April 2024
Mercedes-Benz	Smart EQ Fortwo	April 2024
Renault	Zoe (EV)	March 2024

Source: <u>https://c2a-sec.com/list-of-discontinued-car-models-due-to-un-regulation-no-155-on-vehicle-cybersecurity/</u>



ISO/SAE 21434:2021 Road vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering



- Specifies engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding concept, product development, production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, including their components and interfaces
- Does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity
- Works at *item* level
 - Item: component or set of components (3.1.7) that implements a function at the vehicle level
 - A system can be an item if it implements a function at the vehicle level, otherwise it is a component



EU Cyber Resilience Act

- Approved on 12th March 2024 by the EU Parliament, needs to be formally approved by the Council
- The transition period for the enforcement of the CRA is 36 months, starting at the publication of the document in the European Journal. But, according to Article 11 the reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities to ENISA will already be enforced after 21 months.
 - Q3 2026 and Q4 2027
- Aims to ensure that products with digital features are secure to use, resilient against cyber threats and provide enough information about their security properties



Security Evaluation of ECUs



Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA)

- Identify the assets and their value
 - \rightarrow Potential loss of safety, privacy, money, operation?
- Analyze the attack surface and potential threats
 - Does the attacker need a physical access or can it be done remotely?
 - Can anyone with the access to the attack script do the attack or only experts?
- Derive the risks and how to handle them
 - \rightarrow Quantitatively calculate the risk value
 - Decide on the threshold for acceptable risk and when to apply necessary measures
- After TARA
 - \rightarrow Propose and implement measures to reduce the risks



Source: Microsoft Copilot



Implementing the Measures

- To ensure the data integrity and confidentiality, cryptographic measures should be used
 - → ECUs with a dedicated Hardware Security Module (HSM) should be preferred
 - \rightarrow HSM allows secure storage of cryptographic keys and fast and secure encryption
- Recommended measures
 - \rightarrow Debug access to the unit should be disabled/protected
 - \rightarrow Public key certificates should be used to verify updates and secure the boot process
 - → Strong cryptography should be used
 - \rightarrow RSA with key lengths of at least 3072 bits, ECC with 256 bits, AES
 - \rightarrow Post-quantum cryptography is currently being standardized by NIST
 - Waiting for new crypto hardware for efficient implementations
 - \rightarrow Communication should be authenticated and whenever possible, encrypted



Security Assessment

- Depending on the criticality of the assessed functionality, it can be done by
 - \rightarrow The development/testing team
 - \rightarrow Another team at the same organization
 - \rightarrow 3rd party specializing in security assessment
- Various processes can be included
 - \rightarrow Code analysis (automated or manual)
 - \rightarrow Software penetration testing
 - → Network/application vulnerability assessment
 - \rightarrow Hardware penetration testing
 - \rightarrow Side-channel analysis
- Tests can either be white-box, black-box, or something in between



Conclusion

- Automotive security is currently a hot topic
 - \rightarrow New standards and regulations have been released recently and enter the force from this year
 - \rightarrow The first practical (and dangerous) car hack was shown almost a decade ago
- Manufacturers are adjusting their products to the new legislation
 - \rightarrow Automotive microcontrollers come with HSM
 - \rightarrow ECUs are produced with a firmware to fully utilize the HSM
- Once fully autonomous driving is available, more challenges will emerge
 - \rightarrow Adversarial attacks on artificial intelligence



Thank you.

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